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Abstract 
 
In large databases, creating user interfaces for 
browsing or performing insertion, deletion or 
modification of data is very costly in terms of 
programming.  In addition, each modification of an 
access control policy causes many potential and 
unpredictable side effects which cause rule conflicts or 
security breaches that affect the corresponding user 
interfaces as well. While changes to access control 
policies in databases are inevitable, having a dynamic 
system that generates interfaces according to the latest 
access control policies becomes increasingly valuable. 
Lack of such a system leads to unauthorized access to 
data and eventually violates the privacy of data 
owners. In this work, we discuss a dynamic interface 
that applies Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
policies as the output of policy analysis and limits the 
amount of information that users have access to 
according to the policies defined for roles. This 
interface also shows security administrators the effect 
of their changes from the user’s point of view while 
minimizing the cost by generating the interface 
automatically. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Enforcing access control is a crucial issue in all 
computer systems. Using access control mechanisms 
guarantees that malicious and questionable users 
cannot access sensitive data and also legitimate users 
cannot accidentally access parts of the data that are not 
supposed to be revealed. In large databases, where we 
may have hundreds of different roles and access 
control policies, handling RBAC policies is even 
harder [4]. Furthermore, programming user interfaces 
that conform to the latest dynamic access control 
policies is not generally a straightforward job for the 
following reasons: first, fields may be added to the 
tables in the database after the interface has been 
designed. Hence, the user interface must be redesigned 
again to represent the data included in newly added 
fields. Second, as the number of users and roles 
increase in the database, it becomes difficult to 
program different user interfaces for each role or user. 
Although applying RBAC [7] facilitates managing 
access control policies more efficiently than 
conventional access control methods such as 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) [6], designing a dynamic 
interface that conforms to the access control policies 
needs more work.  
 
1.1.  Contribution of this paper 
 
In this work, we introduce a model that creates 
forms dynamically based on the tables' structures and 
the access policies in the relational database 
management system (RDBMS). This approach reduces 
the extensive amount of work needed to rebuild user 
interfaces based on the access control policies 
statically. Furthermore, this approach enables the 
security officers and designers to have the opportunity 
for immediate testing to see if roles are working as 
they should. This contribution is discussed in Sections 
3 and 4 in which we introduce our approach and the 
dynamic user interface developed based on it. To 
illustrate the functionality of the dynamic interface, 
Section 5 describes an example to demonstrate our 
application. Section 6 concludes the paper and give 
possible future research directions to extend this idea.  
 
2. Background and Related Work 
 
In RBAC [7], object accesses are controlled by roles 
(or job functions) in an enterprise rather than a user or 
a group. RBAC, as an alternative to conventional DAC 
and MAC mechanisms, is required for handling data 
authorization management in a complex environment 
as has been discussed in the literature [7]. RBAC has 
been introduced as a cost effective access control 
mechanism [6]. Due to its characteristics (i.e. rich 
specification, separation of duty and ease of 
management), it is being employed in a large variety of 
domains [8].  
In RBAC, the main goal is to provide a model and 
tool to help manage access controls in an enterprise 
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with a very large number of users and data items. The 
main components of RBAC are roles, users and 
permissions where role represents job functions, and 
permissions are defined on objects and operations. In 
particular, permissions can be defined in terms of 
allowing or preventing a role from performing a 
specific action on a specific data object. 
There have been many extensions of RBAC 
introduced in the literature. For instance, Byun and Li 
[2] introduced a purpose-based access control for 
privacy protection in relational database systems which 
is based on Role-based access cotrol model. As another 
example, Dafa-Alla et al., [3] introduced PRBAC: An 
Extended Role Based Access Control for Privacy 
Preserving Data Mining.  
Although, according to the National Institute of 
Standard and Technology (NIST) standard, there are 
different levels of RBAC including flat, hierarchy, 
constrained, and symmetric options [8], in this work, 
we focus on the flat model and leave the application of 
other techniques as they are really extensions for future 
work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flat RBAC model 
 
In flat RBAC, permissions are assigned to each role 
and users are assigned to one or more roles as shown in 
Figure 1. A user is granted access to an object when 
the user is active in a role that has the required 
permissions. For instance, these two tuples 
 
(Staff, +, Read, email) 
(Staff, -, Update, name) 
 
mean any user with the Staff role has the privilege to 
read the field email but not to update the field name. 
Some of the access control policies can result in a 
possible access rules conflict that affects the access 
level of the user. Vaniea et al. [9] discuss an interface 
that visualizes the output of policy analysis and helps 
security professionals find conflicting policies. In our 
work, we introduce a software package that 
dynamically creates user interfaces based on the user’s 
latest access control privileges. We believe this 
dynamic user interface reduces the extensive amount of 
work needed to rebuild user interfaces based on the 
access control policies statically. 
Agrawal et al. [1] propose a language construct and 
implementation design that restricts the queries 
submitted to the RDBMS to enforce privacy policies. 
In their solution, fields that the user requests to see but 
does not have privilege to access, are returned with a 
null value. This is different from our approach in 
which the user only observes fields for which they 
have privilege to see. Therefore, information about 
existence of the field(s) is not revealed to malicious 
users. 
 
3. Our Approach 
 
In this section, we describe our approach to creating 
a dynamic user interface (DUI) based on user access 
control. As illustrated in Figure 2, our model consists 
of two main engines, Component Manager and RBAC 
Extractor. The data flow is described as follows. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic interface data flow and 
architecture 
 
1. When the user wants to log in to our software, the 
user name and password should match the ones 
entered into the database by the security manager or 
database administrator.  
 
2. After the user authentication is complete, by 
reviewing the User Assignment relationship, the 
RBAC Extractor engine determines roles that are 
assigned to the user by the Security Administrator. 
According to the RBAC architecture [7], each user 
is associated with at least one role.  
 
3. The list of tables the user is allowed to observe are 
then displayed and they specify the form they will 
use. This form is related to one or more table(s) in 
the database. 
 
Permission 
Assignment 
Users Roles  
User 
Assignment 
Permissions 
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4. The RBAC Extractor engine reviews the 
Permission Assignment relationship to identify 
what permissions are assigned to the related roles 
of the user. After considering all the permissions, 
RBAC Extractor provides the Component Manager 
with a list of permissions for four different actions, 
Select, Update, Insert and Delete. These could be 
extended to other operations but we limit our 
discussion to these four operations to illustrate our 
system. 
 
5. The Component Manager identifies the related 
fields on the desirable table(s) and their 
specifications. 
 
6. Finally, the dynamic user interface is created and 
displayed to the user based on the data collected 
through steps 4 and 5. If the user selects another 
table from the list, data flow starts from step 4. 
 
To clarify the task of the Component Manager, 
consider the following example. The user wants to 
work with a form related to table T which has fields a, 
b, c and d. The RBAC Extractor engine determines that 
according to the access control policies this user cannot 
see (or select) fields b and c from this table since 
accessing them is prohibited by one of the user's roles. 
Hence, the Component Manager only shows fields a 
and d on the form to the user. This approach is also 
known as query rewriting and has attracted much 
attention in the literature [1, 5]. The same procedure is 
followed for other actions such as Delete, Update and 
Insert which affects the user interface as well. We will 
discuss each of them in detail in Section 4. 
    
4. Dynamic User Interface 
 
In this section, we describe our system and 
demonstrate its utility. We focused on Microsoft SQL 
Server 2000 and 2005 as a well known RDBMS that 
supports RBAC mechanism. We also used Microsoft 
Visual Basic .NET 2003 to develop the system. 
Through ADO .NET the program connects to the 
RDBMS and extracts information about users, roles 
and permissions stored in system tables. 
Generally, in a RDBMS such as MS SQL Server, to 
enforce access control policies the following steps are 
required of the Security Administrator. First, users and 
roles (job functions) are defined. Second, for each role, 
privileges to access different objects (tables and related 
fields) are defined. Third, one or more roles are 
assigned to each user. There are two forms of 
permission, grant and deny. (Deny is different than 
revoking a permission, and it essentially means a 
negative permission). If the user has a role, and within 
that role they are granted access (i.e. Select) to a 
specific field or table, then the user’s (Select) query on 
the table returns proper results. On the other hand, if 
the user is not privileged to perform the specific action 
on that field or is denied access to that field, then the 
result of the query will be an error message that 
indicates insufficient permissions to Select this field. 
The same rules apply to Insert, Delete, and Update 
permissions. 
Handling permissions of one role for a user seems 
straightforward since no conflict can occur. However, 
often the user has more than one role, and those roles 
may contradict one another. For instance, imagine that 
Alice has two roles called Role1 and Role2. According 
to Role1, she has access to the field CustomerID from 
the Customer table and according to Role2, she is not 
allowed to see this field. According to the security 
policies defined in MS SQL Server system table, Alice 
is not allowed to see that field because the deny 
permission dominates the grant permission. There are 
other possible ways to create contradicting permissions 
such as granting access to the whole table for one role 
and denying access to specific field(s) of the same 
table for another role where a user has both of the 
roles. The algorithm that determines the resulting 
combination of the permissions the user has due to 
their corresponding roles R1 to Rn on a specific field 
has the following pattern: 
 
        ResultingPermission(R1,…,Rn) 
1. result = deny; 
2. For all the roles from R1 to Rn 
If there exist a deny permission then 
result = deny and exit 
         Else if there exist a grant permission then 
  result = grant 
3. Return result 
 
Thus, this system is implemented to enforce the 
access control policies and different combinations of 
the roles defined in RBAC systems. When the user 
logs in, the RBAC Extractor engine identifies the user 
from the list of available users in the RDBMS. All the 
roles associated with the user are then extracted from 
the system tables. Using the above algorithm, the 
engine then determines conflicting parts and generates 
a list of permissions that covers all the roles the user 
has and provides the Component Manager engine with 
that list. To clarify this, consider a user who has two 
roles called Role1 and Role2. The policies for 
permissions to access tables and fields are shown in 
Table 1. The symbol  represents deny and  
represents grant access. If access to a field is not 
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defined by any role (eg. the Address field in Customers 
table) then the user should not have access to that field. 
In other words, the user does not have access to a field 
unless explicitly granted the privilege. 
In our software, we have four classes, CDB, 
CTable, CGrid, and CSet. Class CDB is responsible for 
connecting to the RDBMS and submitting queries to 
the database. CTable is a subdivision of CDB which 
obtains the name of a specific table in the database and 
extracts information about the fields of that table. It 
also connects to the metadata and extracts the 
information about RBAC policies. In other words, 
having the name of a specific table and the user, this 
class determines what permissions are assigned to the 
user to access that specific table. CGrid and CSet are 
two classes that deal with the dynamic user interface 
itself. CGrid is used to display records of a table in the 
form of a grid. CSet is  
 
Table 1. Sample of conflict resolution 
domination 
 
Table Field R1 R2 Result 
Customers 
CustomerID   
CustomerName   
Address   
Employees 
EmployeeID   
EmployeeName   
Phone   
Orders 
EID   
CID   
OrderDate   
Payment   
 
in charge of managing the components of a form 
related to one or more tables. 
To clarify the use of CGrid and CSet we define that 
CGrid is used for the Select, Update and Delete actions 
whereas the CSet is used when we want to Insert a new 
record in a table and we need a form that contains all 
the corresponding fields.  
The above classes interact with the dynamic user 
interface catalogues that we add to the RDBMS. 
Although there are some features of the fields such as 
allow null and data type that can be recognized from 
the tables themselves, there are other features that need 
to be controlled by the user interface as well. Some of 
these features are location of the components on the 
form, enforcing the accurate data type entry by the 
user, component's visibility on the form, and so on. 
Generally, these features are hard coded in an 
executable program which makes a static user 
interface. To represent the semantics of our model we 
propose user interface catalogues in which we store 
component features in the database to be retrieved on 
the user’s demand. The software then uses these 
parameters to create the proper user interface. These 
catalogues, DI_FORMSET and DI_GRIDSET, 
represent information about rows and columns in a grid 
and components in a tabular form. We have 
implemented these catalogues as a set of tables added 
to the RDBMS. Figure 3 illustrates these catalogues 
and the corresponding tables. DI_FORMSET contains 
DI_Set, DI_Ctrl, DI_CtrlType, and DI_Ref tables. 
DI_GRIDSET, in addition to tables DI_Grid and 
DI_GridCol, shares DI_Ref with DI_GRIDSET. 
 
When a form is selected by the user, the system 
refers to the tables DI_Set and DI_Ctrl and extracts all 
the information related to that specific table. In the 
next step, all the components of the form are located 
and their properties are set according to the 
information derived from DI_Set and DI_Ctrl. It is 
clear that in this phase, tables DI_CtrlType and 
DI_REF help the system to enforce the correct data 
types of the components and referring tables, 
respectively. When a form is required to be in the form 
of a grid, DI_GRIDSET catalogue and its 
corresponding tables provide information to the CGrid 
class to illustrate data in a grid. It should be mentioned 
that to fill in the above tables we have prepared a 
simple user interface called DI_Creator. Using this 
software, the Security Administrator can define initial 
features of each element on the form according to the 
specifications described in the design phase of the 
application development. Section 5 will present an 
example to clarify the task of each table and class. 
DI_FORMSET 
DI_GRIDSET 
Figure 3.  Dynamic interface catalogues 
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5. Example 
 
Alice has both Staff and Advisor roles in a 
company. Based on her roles and the access control 
policies defined by the Security Administrator of the 
company, she has corresponding accesses of Select, 
Insert, Update and Delete on different fields and 
tables. For instance, as shown in Figure 4 (a) and (b), 
role Advisor can Select all of the fields in the Customer 
table. However, role Staff can Select the field City, and 
is not allowed to see other columns of the customer 
table (except the field CompanyName where no grant 
or deny permission is explicitly specified). 
 
(a) 
(a)Advisor’s access control policy 
 
(b) Staff’s access control policy 
 
Figure 4. Access control for roles Advisor and Staff 
 
Since Alice has both Staff and Advisor roles, and 
we assume that negated permission is dominant, 
according to the combinations discussed in Table 1, 
she is only able to see the fields City and 
CompanyName. As  described  in Section 3, the RBAC 
 Figure 5. Dynamic user interface created 
for Alice 
 
Extractor engine is responsible for finding the right 
combination of roles and provides the results to the 
Component Manager. In this example, the Component 
Manager needs to show the above two fields in the 
Customers table to Alice. Hence, when she logs in to 
the system and clicks on the Customers form she sees 
the user interface shown in Figure 5. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
We have presented a model for generating dynamic 
interfaces based on the RBAC policy. This approach 
can be extremely useful in large databases used in 
enterprises where a large amount of resources are spent 
to design, develop and maintain the user interfaces. 
Since this model dynamically creates the user 
interfaces and also enforces the latest RBAC policies, 
it saves a considerable amount of time and cost when 
producing middleware that works with databases. From 
the privacy point of view, unlike current approaches, 
our work does not reveal the existence of fields to the 
users who are not privileged to access.  
Our future work is to extend the techniques 
presented in this paper to create a dynamic user 
interface for applying privacy policies stored in privacy 
preserving database systems. 
In future work, developers can add their own class 
to the software to support more features. In this case, 
options like reporting and printing can be added to the 
system. Also, it would be an interesting project to use 
this methodology in web-based applications as well. 
Another interesting future research direction that 
we are working on is to incorporate the notion of trust 
in to the model. For example, when a user has several 
unnecessary accesses to a piece of data, the systems 
learns this behavior and reduces the level of trust in 
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that particular user. The lack of trust results in 
automatic modification of the policies in place which 
reduces the privilege(s) given to the user. Once the 
policy is modified, it effects the user interface as well. 
In brief, unnecessary and redundant access to data 
items result in losing the privilege of accessing them. 
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